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CULTURAL COGNITION INSIGHTS
INTO JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING IN
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CASES
PAUL M. SECUNDA*
People make mistakes. Even administrators of ERISA plans.1

I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the theory of cultural cognition in a specialized
context with implications for judicial decisionmaking.2 It seeks to
investigate how opinion-writing and institutional judicial debiasing
strategies may work in practice in the particularly arcane and maddeningly

*

Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I dedicate this
article to my wife, Mindy Young-Secunda, without whose love and support I would be
unable to focus on, and complete, my many legal academic projects. I must make two
disclosures at the outset of this article. First, there is the distinct possibility that the
writings contained herein are filled with the same culturally-motivated cognition and
cognitive illiberalism that I seek to eliminate in future ERISA cases. Second, part of
this bias might inevitably flow from the fact that I co-authored an amicus brief in
support of the losing side in the Conkright case. See Brief of Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010) (No.
08-810), 2009 WL 4074863 (filed with Donald Bogan). Finally, although all views
contained herein are mine alone, I would like to thank Nancy Levit, Brendan Maher,
Peter Stris, Andrew Stumpff, Donald Bogan, John Langbein, and Michael Duff, for
their helpful comments and insights on earlier drafts of this paper.
1
Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1644 (2010) (Robert, J.).
2
Culturally-motivated cognition is “the ubiquitous tendency of people to form
perceptions, and to process factual information generally, in a manner congenial to
their values and desires.” Dan M. Kahan et al., ‘They Saw a Protest’: Cognitive
Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 853 (2012)
[hereinafter They Saw a Protest]. Professor Kahan and other members of Yale Law
School’s Cultural Cognition Project have methodically applied culture cognition theory
to various disputed matters in different areas of the law. See THE CULTURAL
COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://www.culturalcognition.net (last
visited Feb. 28, 2013). The Project is made up of “a group of scholars interested in
studying how cultural values shape public risk perceptions and related policy beliefs.”
Id.
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complex area of employee benefits law,3 under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).4 The proposal advanced here is to
professionalize the judicial corps through the establishment of a specialized
ERISA court based on the existing bankruptcy court model.5 This
approach will promote opinion-writing, debiasing techniques that reduce
the amount of cognitive illiberalism in employee benefits law opinions.6
The establishment of ERISA courts in necessary to counteract the
increasing phenomenon of decisionmaking hubris with cognitive origins,
which is prevalent today in many labor and employment law cases in the
United States.7 Anthropological and psychological explanations, based on
3

The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the huge interpretive challenges ERISA poses
recently in Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1644 (2010): “[T]he Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is ‘an enormously complex and detailed
statute,’ and the plans that administrators must construe can be lengthy and
complicated.” 130 S. Ct. at 1644 (quoting, in part, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508
U.S. 248, 262 (1993)); see also Andrew W. Stumpff, The Law is a Fractal: The
Attempt to Anticipate Everything, LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2157804 (discussing ERISA as having “maze-like complexity”
and being “borne of the attempt to be specific about every possible fact situation.”).
4
29 U.S.C. § 1001-1416 (2011). Following the practice of other ERISA scholarship,
this article utilizes the original section numbers as enacted by Congress, rather than the
United States Code Section numbers.
5
I am not the first one to advance the idea of specialized ERISA courts, but I am the
first one to do so in quite some time and based on lessons learned from cultural
cognition theory. John Langbein wrote, in 1990:
If the Court is bored with the detail of supervising complex bodies of
statutory law, thought should be given to having that job done by a court that
would take it seriously. The solution long familiar on the Continent is to
have separate courts of last resort superintend such fields. A supreme court
specializing in ERISA matters, and probably in Social Security and tax law as
well, would treat these subjects with respect, which is more than can be said
for the U.S. Supreme Court in [Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.] Bruch [489
U.S. 101 (1989)] . . . .
ERISA is an ideal field for experimenting with specialized courts: It is complex,
it is important, and it is relatively well delimited from other fields. The evidence
from Bruch is that this is a sphere of subject matter jurisdiction that the Supreme
Court would scarcely miss. See John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks
Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 229 (1990); see also LAWRENCE BAUM,
SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 5 (2011) (maintaining that many courts in the United
States are already more specialized than most observers realize).
6
Cognitive Illiberalism is an interpretative method that “incur[s a] cost to democratic
legitimacy associated with labeling the perspective of persons who share a particular
cultural identity ‘unreasonable’ and, hence, unworthy of consideration in the
adjudicatory process.” Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose
Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism,
122 HARV. K. REV. 837, 842 (2009) [hereinafter Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe].
7
See id. (contending that Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372 (2007), constituted “a type of decisionmaking hubris that has cognitive
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cultural cognition theory, help in providing meaningful insights into some
of the more controversial of these decisions.8 Indeed, cultural cognition
robustly explains how Justices’ cultural background values in labor and
employment law cases may unconsciously lead to different perceptions of
legally-consequential facts in such cases.9
The resulting opinions by the Justices in these labor and employment
cases can suffer from cognitive illiberalism, which too readily discounts the
views of dissenters in favor of the majority’s views of the case. Yet, social
science has been shown to hold out promise for ridding legal decisions of
this form of delegitimizing bias while simultaneously making these judicial
opinions more acceptable to a larger segment of society.10 More
specifically, opinion-writing debiasing methods, including utilizing
humility as a judicial habit of mind and writing in an expressively overdeterministic way, may make labor and employment decisions less
polarizing.11
In addition to opinion-writing debiasing strategies, cognitive
illiberalism may be susceptible to certain institutional debiasing strategies
that may help to constrain some of the more potent forms of this type of
bias.12 Although there are advantages and disadvantages that come with
specialized courts and judges,13 “the promise of opacity” and expertise in
judicial decisionmaking that accompany specialized courts nevertheless
make them an attractive alternative to more traditional models.14 Judges on
origins and that had deleterious consequences that extend far beyond the Court’s
decision in Scott.”).
8
See Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107, 111
(2010) [hereinafter Cultural Cognition at Work].
9
See id. at 121-148 (analyzing, through the lens of cultural cognition theory, the
cases of NLRB v. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. 775, 793 (1990) and Engquist v. Oregon
Dep’t of Agric., 552 U.S. 591, 594 (2008)).
10
See generally DAVID W. ROHDE AND HAROLD SPAETH, SUPREME COURT
DECISIONMAKING (1976). But see Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other
Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, Speech at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
(March 19, 1993), available at http://notabug.com/kozinski/breakfast (noting that
although judges do have considerable discretion in certain aspects of their decisions,
“[t]hey simply can’t do anything they well please.”).
11
See ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 10, at 140-48.
12
See Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing
Strategies, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 373, 392-406 (2012) [hereinafter Cognitive
Illiberalism] (examining four different institutional models, including: magistrate
model, bankruptcy court model, Article III appellate court model, and British
employment tribunal model).
13
For advantages, see BAUM, supra note 5, at 4 (describing “neutral virtues” of
judicial specialization as “quality of decisions, efficiency, and uniformity in the law.”).
For disadvantages, see id. at 2 (“Specialization leads people to take narrow perspectives
that limits and biases their understanding of matters they address. Further,
specialization makes judges more susceptible to external control or ‘capture.’”).
14
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 410-414.
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such specialized courts simultaneously have familiarity with complex
subject matters and are relatively shielded from the normal partisan politics
surrounding high-stakes, judicial decisionmaking. Although no system of
judicial decisionmaking will be completely free of the effects of cultural
cognition,15 such debiasing strategies could lead to employee benefit
decisions more likely based upon widely accepted perceptions of fact and
evaluations of legal arguments rather than upon the unconscious cultural
biases of the sitting judge.16
This article proceeds in three parts. The first part summarizes the basic
principles behind the phenomena of cultural cognition and cognitive
illiberalism.17 The second part of the paper then considers – in substantial
detail – a possible example of the operation of these phenomena in the
recent U.S. Supreme Court ERISA case of Conkright v. Frommert.18
Lastly, the third part illustrates how combining opinion-writing and
institutional debiasing strategies through the establishment of federal
ERISA courts could potentially provide a psychologically realistic
mechanism for counteracting cognitively illiberal reasoning in future
ERISA cases.19
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW ON CULTURAL COGNITION THEORY AND THE
CONCEPT OF COGNITIVE ILLIBERALISM
This Part provides a brief synopsis of cultural cognition theory and
presents the concept of cognitive illiberalism in judicial decisionmaking.
The first section describes the social science bases of cultural cognition and
the manner in which judges’ values unconsciously affect their
decisionmaking, especially in fields like ERISA where there is a high
degree of complexity and indeterminacy in the law.20 The second section
discusses the problems associated with cognitive illiberalism, which causes
judges to ignore or downplay the views of dissenters in favor of their own
15
See id. at 111 n. 15 (“[S]ome forms of judicial bias in judicial opinions are
desirable. Judges should generally evaluate situations in a way that embodies a stance
toward phenomena in the world that accurately expresses what they . . . care about.”).
This article merely seeks to reign in decisionmaking which exhibits “overconfidence in
the unassailable correctness of the factual perceptions [that judges] hold in common
with [their] confederates.” Id. (citing Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe, supra
note 6, at 843).
16
See BAUM, supra note 5, at 32 (“The propositions that specialists can do more than
generalists and that they can do their work better seems self-evident to most people.”).
17
See infra at pp. 3-10
18
130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010); see infra at pp. 10-18.
19
See infra pp. 18-25.
20
See generally Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 433 (2010) (offering a theoretical overview of uncertainty in ERISA
legal rules and the judicial reaction thereto). Interestingly enough, Stris and Maher
represented the plaintiffs in Conkright.
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views in a case.21 Part III will then turn to a case study of an ERISA
decision that exhibits signs of both cultural cognition and cognitive
illiberalism.22

A. Cultural Cognition Theory: New Legal Realism Meets
Anthropology and Psychology
As an initial matter, cultural cognition, also sometimes referred to as
culturally-motivated cognition, can be thought of as an anthropologically
and psychologically-based type of New Legal Realism.23 That is, this legal
approach has been advanced as an antidote to the prevailing neoclassical
economic view of the law that has dominated legal discourse in the
academy over the last few decades.24 As Professors Nourse and Shaffer
have recently commented in discussing this intellectual movement, the
challenge for New Legal Realism scholars is to promote:
a framework of law strongly enough to restrain human weakness
and irrationality but supple enough to allow people to govern
themselves, a framework supported by a scholarly agenda that
provides new analytic and theoretical tools to understand a world
in which we have come to see ourselves as both highly vulnerable
to institutional collapse and yet capable of effecting change.25
Cultural cognition theory fits squarely into this legal framework by
both seeking to construct a framework of law to understand human
irrationality, while simultaneously providing analytical and theoretical
tools for preventing future conflicts among individuals over legally

21

See infra pp. 9-10.
See infra pp. 10-18.
23
Other scholars have developed and discussed various forms of “New Legal
Realism.” See, e.g., Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal
Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
61, 64-65 (2009) (surveying the scholarship and arguing that “’new legal realism’ is a
response to a ‘new formalism’ – that derived from neoclassical law and economics.”);
see also Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t
What They Used to Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 387 (2005); Thomas J. Miles & Cass
R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2004) (citing Karl N.
Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism – Responding to Dean Proud, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222 (1931)).
24
What these approaches have in common is that they seek to respond to recent
world events, which “highlight in dramatic fashion how the formal assumptions of
neoclassical [economic] theory failed to predict or prevent a massive world economic
collapse, not to mention massive political mobilization and a historic election [in
2008].” Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 23, at 65.
25
Id. at 64.
22
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consequential facts.26 These conflicts especially arise when individuals
must make sense of uncertain and inherently ambiguous facts in the many
areas of our increasingly complex legal landscape.27
Cultural cognition theory has its roots in both anthropology and social
psychology. Anthropologically, it relies on studies that explore the
relationship between risk perceptions and cultural worldviews.28 These
worldviews “are the filters through which a person views the world – how
it is and how it should be – that profoundly influence peoples’ attitudes.”29
A number of scholars have developed a typology of cultural worldviews
which categorizes people based on their ideas about the relationship of the
individual to the group (individualistic versus communitarian orientations)
and based on their views on the nature of society (hierarchical versus
egalitarian orientations).30 As far as the relationship of the individual to the
group, one is considered “low group” if they favor individualistic social
orders, and one is considered “high group” if they support solidaristic or
communitarian social orders.31 On the other hand, as to views about the
nature of society, one is “low grid” if they favor individualistic social
orders, and one is “high grid” if they believe in a society with hierarchies.32
By combining the group and grid characteristics described above, one
finds the various forms of prototypical cultural worldviews in modern
society. For instance, members of the Democratic Party and people of
color tend to be high group/low grid (communitarians/egalitarians), while
members of the Republican Party and politically-conservative, white males
are broadly seen as low group/high grid (individualistic and hierarchical).
These anthropological characterizations help us understand, while are
highly predictive of the ways in which different populations vary in their
factual perceptions about the important legal and political issues of the
26

See supra note 2 and accompanying text (“The [Cultural Cognition] Project also
has an explicit normative objective: to identify processes of democratic decisionmaking
by which society can resolve culturally grounded differences in belief in a manner that
is both congenial to persons of diverse cultural outlooks and consistent with sound
public policymaking.”).
27
See Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 23, at 128-129.
28
See MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY 54-68
(1970).
29
See Marjorie Komhauser, Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare Benefits,
40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 258 (2009) (“Worldviews are primarily unconscious and
affectively-based cognitive systems of beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions. They serve
as a framework for an individual’s interaction with her surroundings, including other
people and society.”).
30
See Cultural Cognition at Work, supra note 8, at 113 (citing Komhauser, supra
note 29, at 258).
31
See id. (citing Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public
Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 156-57 (2006) [hereinafter Cultural Cognition
and Public Policy]).
32
Id.
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day.33
For the most part, social psychology provides important insights into
the mechanisms (cognitive-dissonance avoidance, affect, biased
assimilation, and group polarization) that help explain the significant role
cultural values play in assisting individuals in determining which state of
affairs promote their interests. The upshot is that individuals seek to: (1)
avoid conflict between new ideas and preexisting beliefs, (2) reject ideas
that evoke emotions such as fear or anger, (3) accept new information only
if consistent with their prior beliefs, and (4) rely only on others whom they
trust to tell them which new information to believe and which to discount.34
Taken together, these psychological mechanisms explain that because
individuals, in many situations, do not have access to the necessary factual
information to form their own opinions on issues, they tend to fall back on
their own preexisting beliefs, “gut” feelings, or other individuals in whom
they already have confidence.35 The consequence of this dynamic is that,
“[s]tates of persistent group polarization are . . . inevitable – almost
mathematically so – as beliefs feed on themselves within cultural groups,
whose members stubbornly dismiss as unworthy insights originating
outside the group.36
Relying on these anthropological and social insights, cultural cognition
theory posits that cultural worldviews have an unconscious, but significant,
influence on the perception of fact.37
In the realm of judicial
decisionmaking, cultural values can be seen as acting as an unconscious
33

See Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining
the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007)
(illustrating that cultural worldviews more powerfully explain differences of risk
perception and legally-consequential facts than do other individual characteristics).
34
See Cultural Cognition at Work, supra note 8, at 115-17.
35
See id. at 116.
36
See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 125
(2007). Indeed, various empirical studies conducted by Kahan and his colleagues have
established that persons with individualist, hierarchical values tend to be skeptical
about facts and arguments that support a more communitarian or egalitarian social
model because endorsing those arguments would work counter too their culturallyidentified group. See, e.g., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe, supra note 6
(linking individual views on whether police used excessive force in the U.S. Supreme
Court case of Scott v. Harris, involving a high-speed car chase, to a person’s cultural
worldviews and their perceptions of the legally-consequential facts in the Harris case);
see also They Saw a Protest, supra note 2 (establishing that cultural cognition theory
provides important insights into how individuals perceive facts in a hypothetical protest
scenario and how they distinguish between constitutionally protected speech and
unprotected conduct).
37
See Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some
Problems For Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011) [hereinafter
Foreword: Neutral Principles] (“Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of
individuals to conform their perceptions of risk and other policy-consequential facts to
their cultural worldviews.”).
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influence on judicial cognition.38 In other words, what the legally
consequential facts say to a judge largely depends upon to whom the facts
are speaking.39
The cultural world views of judges unavoidably influence them,
especially where judges have gaps in their legal knowledge or are
encountering new types of information for the first time.40 The resulting
legal opinions are written in a manner that is congenial to their preexisting
cultural values.41 This decisionmaking dynamic appears to be at work in
some general labor and employment law cases,42 so it would appear to
equally exist in the employee benefit law context where legal uncertainty
and ambiguity especially reign.43
One need only consider the most common type of ERISA claim,44 the
denial-of-benefit claim under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), to see that this
area is rife with ambiguities.45 These cases concern the entitlement of an
38

See Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, supra note 31, at 157-58; see also Dan
M. Kahan, “Ideology In” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What Difference Does
It Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 421 (2009) (maintaining that same cultural cognition
dynamic affects judges in deciding cases as affects individuals when they interpret
ambiguous facts).
39
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 381; see also Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe, supra note 6, at 891 (“The [U.S. Supreme] Court’s failure to
recognize the culturally partial view of social reality that its conclusion embodies is
symptomatic of a kind of cognitive bias that is endemic to legal . . . decisionmaking
and that needlessly magnifies cultural conflict over and discontent with the law.”).
40
See Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics Problem in
Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 394 (2006) (“[W]hen decision
makers use simplifying heuristics, they are likely to make mistakes in the direction of
their preexisting biases.”)
41
See Cultural Cognition at Work, supra note 8, at 108, 111. This means that most
judges end up not being the ideological partisans they are sometimes made out to be.
Rather, they are disagreeing fundamentally about the legally consequential facts upon
which case outcomes turn
42
See id. at 113-14; see also Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 384 (“In this
regard, one need only consider recent, heated debates between management and labor
interests concerning gender discrimination against women in the American workplace,
the need for vital private and public sector unions in the American workplace, and the
debate over whether the employment at will doctrine should be discarded into the
dustbin of history.”).
43
For a more evocative view of ERISA’s complexity, see DeFelice v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting John Milton, Paradise Lost,
bk. 2, 11 592-94 (1667), in 1 NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF LITERATURE 1445, 48 (M.H.
Abrams ed., 5th ed. 1986)) (describing ERISA as a “gulf profound as the Serbonian
bog/Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old/Where armies whole have sunk.”).
44
See RICHARD A. BALES, JEFFREY M. HIRSCH & PAUL M. SECUNDA,
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 226 (2007) (“Claims for benefits are by far the
most common types of claims under ERISA.”).
45
See, e.g., John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme
Court’s Trial of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317,
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individual to pension or welfare benefits based on their employer-provided
benefit plans.46 Cultural cognition theory would explain that hierarchical
and individualistic-oriented judges tend to favor employers and plan
administrators in their interpretation of the plan language in order to ensure
plan predictability, uniformity, and low administrative costs.47 On the
other hand, judges with a communitarian and egalitarian bent would tend to
see facts in a way that would allow participants and beneficiaries to recover
contested benefits since the “primary purpose” of ERISA is to ensure
employees receive promised benefits.48 The discussion of Conkright v.
Frommert in Part III below illustrates this dynamic a play in such a U.S.
Supreme Court denial-of-benefit case.49
For now, however, it suffices to say that in the employee benefits law
context, as in other complex areas of law, cultural cognition provides a
robust explanation of how judicial values impact legal decisions and how
disagreements come to exist between judges in highly-charged cases.50
Indeed, cultural cognition theory’s emphasis on judicial disagreements
about legally consequential facts over which there is some speculation
helps to explain why decisions in these cases tend to be infused with
cognitive illiberalism.
B. Cognitive Illiberalism and Its Impact
on Neutral Judicial Decisionmaking
Cognitive illiberalism is “the vulnerability of . . . legal decisionmakers
to betray their commitment to liberal neutrality by unconsciously fitting
their perceptions of risk and related facts to their sectarian understanding of
the good life.”51 Cognitive illiberalism is primarily problematic in the
judicial decisionmaking context because it threatens neutral
1320 (2003).
46
See Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of
ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 146-48 (2009) [hereinafter Sorry, No Remedy]
(describing the nature of benefit denial remedy and the standard for federal court
review of these plan administrator decisions).
47
See, e.g., id. at 134 (noting that “the Court has . . . emphasized a subsidiary policy
of containing employee benefits plan costs . . . to ensure that employers continue to
voluntarily adopt ERISA plans.”). Indeed, Supreme Court Justices can be readily
divided by their ERISA interpretative philosophies into two camps: “literalists” and
“remedialists.” See id. at 159-65. Broadly speaking, literalists tend to be judges with
hierarchical and individualistic tendencies, while remedialists tend to the
communitarian and egalitarian in their orientation.
48
Id. at 133 (“[P]rimary purpose of ERISA is clearly stated in [statute] to be the
protection of employees’ benefits.”); see also S.R. No. 93-127 (1973); H.R. Rep. No.
93-533 (1973).
49
See infra at pp. 12-21.
50
See Cultural Cognition at Work, supra note 8, at 109.
51
Id. at 383.
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decisionmaking.52 So, whereas the phenomenon of cultural cognition
explains how values unconsciously inform judicial decisionmaking,
cognitive illiberalism explains why judges write legal opinions that “tend
selectively to credit empirical information in patterns congenial to their
cultural values.”53 This phenomenon causes judges to discount the views
of groups with different cultural outlooks and to, subsequently, alienate
those opposing groups.54
As discussed above, in the ERISA context, this dynamic transforms
everyday debates on how to protect employee pension and welfare benefits
into instances of legal competition between employers and their
employees.55 There is also a competition between judges as far as deciding
what facts really matter in these cases. Literalist Justices tend to credit
empirical information in their opinions which leads to legal outcomes that
favor hierarchical and individualistic notions of management rights,
including giving employers and plan administrators substantial discretion
in interpreting benefit plan language to deny employee benefits claims.56
Remedialist Justices, for their part, focus on legally consequential facts that
tend to favor an egalitarian or communitarian orientation, which in turn
calls for a less restrictive reading of statutory language so that employees
may receive their pension or welfare benefits in contested cases.57
Although there are assuredly disagreements over the appropriate legal
standards in many ERISA cases, I contend that what explains many ERISA
case outcomes is disagreement over the meaning of legally consequential
facts.
In short, decisionmaking that drifts toward a prevailing judge’s cultural
worldview leads to cognitively illiberal judicial opinions that endanger
judicial legitimacy. Such opinion writing, many times with the judge being
52

See id. at 380 (“The judicial role in society is popularly understood by its principle
purpose of providing a fair adjudication of disputes by a neutral decisionmaker – the
judge or the jury.”); see also BAUM, supra note 5, at 50 (“Neutrality is inherent to most
people’s conceptions of what courts should be.”).
53
See They Saw a Protest, supra note 2, at 859.
54
The social psychology literature refers to this dynamic as naïve realism. See
generally Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal:
“Naïve Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 404, 405 (1995) (“It speaks to the individual’s unshakable conviction that he or
she is somehow privy to an invariant, knowable, objective reality – a reality that other
will also perceive faithfully . . . [and] that others are apt to misperceive . . . .”).
55
See Cultural Cognition at Work, supra note 8, at 110.
56
As will be discussed in more detail in Part III below, the Court’s decisions in
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) and Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008), which provide substantial latitude for benefit plan
administrators to deny benefits under an “arbitrary and capricious” review standard, are
emblematic of literalist Justices’ decisionmaking.
57
Remedialist reasoning is grounded in “the common law of trust and remedial
nature of ERISA.” Cultural Cognition at Work, supra note 8, at 159.

2013]

CULTURAL COGNITION INSIGHTS

11

unaware of this dynamic, unnecessarily maligns other cultural groups’
perceptions of what “really” happened in the case. The thwarted cultural
group will not surprisingly react negatively to such judicial
decisionmaking, and their confidence will be eroded in the judiciary’s
neutrality.
To show the dangers inherent in producing opinions filled with this
form of delegitimizing bias, this paper turns to a case study of a recent
ERISA U.S. Supreme Court decision. Because, as discussed above, ERISA
is filled with complex statutory and regulatory terms governing benefit plan
operation, it provides an ideal example of how culturally-motivated
cognition operates in such an opinion and illustrates how background
cultural values come to play a prominent role in judicial decisionmaking.
This case also provides an example of how a judicial opinion may engender
unnecessary cognitive illiberalism among the communities that are
impacted by the decision as they credit one side’s view of the legally
consequential facts and simultaneously discounting or ignoring the view of
rival parties.
III. AN EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CASE STUDY: “DUDE, WHERE’S MY
PENSION?”
The 2010 case of Conkright v. Frommert58 appears to be an example of
the Supreme Court majority opinion unnecessarily placing its institutional
legitimacy at risk by neither understanding its susceptibility to culturallymotivated cognition nor the cognitive illiberalism that such forms of
decisionmaking engender in the larger society.59 The first section of this
Part described the holding of the Court’s majority and focuses on the
language the court utilizes in coming to that holding.60 The second section
investigates the factual underpinnings of the Court’s holding.61 The third
section then seeks to view the Conkright decision through the lens of
cultural cognition theory and comes to understand the decision as a
cognitively illiberal one.62
58

130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010).
A cautionary note:
I do not seek to psychoanalyze the Justices or analyze the motives of any judge.
It makes no sense to look at a particular individual and say that a particular
perception on his or her part involves ‘cultural cognition,’ as the theory is best
understood as a phenomenon of collective decisionmaking. Rather, this Article
offers an account of how we, as observers of judges’ decisions, make sense of
what’s going on in those decisions. Yet, to avoid awkwardness in exposition in
the analysis below, the Article frequently talks about the Justices’ reasoning as if
we could see cultural cognition operating in judges’ minds.
Cultural Cognition at Work, supra note 8, at 121 n.76.
60
See infra at Part III.A.
61
See infra at Part III.B.
62
See infra at Part III.C.
59
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A. “Man Does Not Live by Words Alone”
It is the rare Supreme Court case where a three-word, first sentence of
an opinion tells you everything you need to know about how the case will
be decided. It is even rarer in an ERISA case.63
But, that is exactly what occurred in Conkright, where the majority
opinion’s first sentence is: “People make mistakes.”64 The second sentence
– “Even administrators of ERISA plans” – furthers the reasonable reader’s
view that the plan administrator would, under no circumstances, be held
liable under ERISA for their “single honest mistake.”65
Conkright dealt with a dispute over the calculation of pension benefits
between Xerox and a group of retired employees.66 The “single honest
mistake” in question involved an important pension calculation – the socalled phantom account offset method – with, literally, millions of dollars
in pension money hanging in the balance for the retirees.67 Although
ERISA contains a well-defined process for disputing denial of benefits
under a plan,68 the law had been previously silent when the plan
administrator initially interpreted the plan initially interpreted the plan in a
way that a court deemed “arbitrary and capricious.”69
63

See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1644 (2010) (quoting Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993)) (observing that ERISA is “an
enormously complex and detailed statute.”); see also DiFelice v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2003) (comparing ERISA to a Serbonian
bog).
64
See Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1644.
65
Id. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court reversed (5-3), with Justice
Sotomayor not participating, holding that the district court should have applied a
deferential standard of review to the plan administrator’s new interpretation of the
pension plan, even after the administrator’s plan interpretation had been deemed
“arbitrary and capricious” by the lower federal courts. See id. at 1651-52 (quoting
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989)).
66
See id. at 1644-45.
67
See id. at 1645 (noting that the dispute stemmed from the fact that Xerox failed to
engage in a reasonable interpretation of its pension plan and that the plaintiffs never
received proper notice that Xerox would be using the phantom account offset technique
in calculating pension benefits).
68
Before bringing a Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim under ERISA in state and federal
court, a plan participant must exhaust his or her internal claims procedures. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1. Once the internal claims procedures have been exhausted, and the
participant has filed the claim in state or federal court, the issue becomes under what
standard of review courts should review such benefit determinations. See supra note
43 and accompanying text.
69
See Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Which of these cases
says that, after the trustee has abused its discretion, a district court must still defer to
the trustee? None of them do. I repeat: Not a single case cited y the Scott treatise
writers supports the majority’s reading of the treatise.”) (emphasis in original).
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One might think, therefore, that some significant legal issue or
principle would come to determine this type of employee benefits case.
For example, perhaps the Supreme Court would decide that the common
law of trusts, which often informs ERISA decisions, needed to be applied
to the case in one manner or another in the employee benefits law context.70
But, after considering and finding existing trust authorities to be ambiguous
on the question, the majority opinion in Conkright expressly concluded that
trust law did not provide a definitive answer.71
Perhaps, then, the Court’s decision would be a reconsideration of the
Firestone standard of review in denial-of-benefit cases,72 which, since
1989, had permitted benefit plans to place discretion in their plan
administrators and have their claim decisions reviewed under a highly
deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard.73 But, instead, the majority
in Conkright concluded that Firestone, and the more recent and related case
of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn,74 continued to provide
the appropriate standard of deferential review for federal district courts
reviewing previously-determined, “arbitrary and capricious” denial of
benefit claims.75
There was even a thought among some amici, based on past labor and
employment law cases, that this case would come down under a new
application of existing administrative law principles.76 The new legal
70

See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1995) (“[W]e recognize that these
[ERISA] fiduciary duties draw much of their content from the common law of trusts,
the law that governed most benefit plans before ERISA’s enactment.”); Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA abounds with the language
and terminology of trust law.”).
71
See Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1648 (“Here trust law does not resolve the specific
issue before us”).
72
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 101.
73
At first, the Supreme Court in Firestone stated that the benefit decision was to be
reviewed de novo by the Court. Id. at 115. However, the Court then indicated that if
the benefit plan contains language vesting the plan administrator with discretionary
authority, the benefit determination decision is reviewed under a deferential, arbitrary
and capricious standard. Id. Unsurprisingly, the Firestone decision has led most
employers to design plans with language investing its plan administrators with the
necessary discretionary authority in order to take advantage of the more favorable
review standard. See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 532 (3d ed. 2011).
74
554 U.S. 105 (2008) (affirming that a deferential standard of review is appropriate
when the plan grants the plan administrator discretionary authority to determine
eligibility in a case where the plan administer operates under a structural conflict of
interest).
75
See Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1646-47.
76
See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010) (No. 08-810) (citing Mead v. Tilley,
490 U.S. 714, 722 (1989)) (arguing that “[b]ecause the Second Circuit previously
rejected Petitioners’ interpretation of the operative pre-1998 Plan documents under the
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theory would effectively say that whereas district courts must generally
defer to the interpretation of the plan by administrators in the first instance,
such deference is no longer required once the plan has already been found
to have interpreted plan language in an “arbitrary and capricious” way.77
But the majority opinion in Conkright does not discuss, at any time, how
administrative law principles might apply in the case’s factual scenario.
No, it appears that once the majority decided, as a factual matter, that
Xerox, in interpreting its own pension plan, had made a “single honest
mistake,” the outcome of the case was preordained.78 Plaintiff retirees had
to know they had lost the case. How can you blame someone for messing
up “in good faith,” after all?79
Because once the Court determined that Xerox’s behavior had been
merely mistaken and not an intentional violation of ERISA, it was clear
that the Court would give Xerox a second chance to reinterpret its pension
plan in a non-arbitrary and capricious manner. Indeed, the case was sent
back to the district court with instructions to properly defer, under the
Firestone trust law-based deferential review standard as being unreasonable, the only
new deference theory Petitioners’ can be advancing here is an administrative law-based
deference, where courts may respect or credit an agency’s advocacy position.”).
77
See id. at 11 (arguing that “[l]ower federal courts applying Firestone have
confused deference in ERISA claims with the kind of deference courts extend to
administrative agencies.”).
78
Indeed, the Conkright majority used the phrase – “single honest mistake” – three
times in its opinion. See Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1644 (“The question here is whether a
single honest mistake in plan interpretation justifies stripping the administrator of that
deference for subsequent related interpretations of the plan.”); id. at 1647 (“If, as we
held in Glenn, a systemic conflict of interest does not strip a plan administrator of
deference, . . . it is difficult to see why a single honest mistake would require a different
result.”); id. at 1649 (“But the interests in efficiency, predictability, and uniformity –
and the manner in which they are promoted by deference to reasonable plan
construction by administrators – do not suddenly disappear simply because a plan
administrator has made a single honest mistake.”); see also Frommert v. Conkright,
825 F. Supp. 2d 433, 442 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The issue before me at this point . . . is
not whether the plaintiffs have offered a reasonable interpretation of the Plan, but
whether the Plan Administrator has. The Supreme Court made it quite clear that this
Court should defer to the Administrator’s views in this manner, which means that the
Court should accept his approach, unless it is patently unreasonable.”) (emphasis in
original). Justice Breyer, in his Conkright dissent, disagreed with this single-honestmistake approach of the majority: “[T]he majority’s absolute ‘one free honest mistake’
rule is impractical, for it requires courts to determine what is ‘honest,’ encourages
appeals on the point, and threatens to delay further proceedings that already take too
long.” Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer did not, however,
undertake to show, based on the record evidence in the case, why Xerox’s actions with
regard to the retirees did not, in fact, amount to a “single honest mistake.”
79
See Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1647 (“[I]f the settler who creates a trust grants
discretion to the trustee, it seems doubtful that the settler would want the trustee
divested entirely of that discretion simply because of one good-faith mistake.”)
(emphasis added).
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Firestone standard, to Xerox’s second interpretation of the plan.80
Unremarkably, this second interpretation deprived plaintiff retirees of a
substantial sum of retirement income. Additionally, many future ERISA
plaintiffs will now have to continue to fight a difficult, uphill battle to get
their benefit denial claims overturned by a reviewing court, even if the first
plan interpretation is admittedly “arbitrary and capricious.”81
So, because the majority in Conkright made the legally-consequential,
factual determination that Xerox really had not meant to do what it did
with regard to the phantom account offset calculation, the Court said thrice
that “a single honest mistake” should not change the basic rules of ERISA
plan interpretation by administrators.82 And because it was just a “single
honest mistake,” the Conkright majority agreed with Xerox that stripping
plan administrators of deferential court review once they made such a
mistake would upset the uniform and predictable administration of ERISA
plans.83

80

See id. at 1652. This deference to Xerox’s second interpretation occurred in the
district court’s opinion on remand. There, the district court deferred to the Xerox’s
plan administration’s new interpretation of the plan, stating: “Having reviewed the
voluminous submissions in this case, I conclude that the Administrator’s proposed
interpretation of the Plan is reasonable, and, guided by the Supreme Court’s
admonitions, I accepted that interpretation.” See Frommert v. Conkright, 825 F. Supp.
2d 433, 440 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). The district court’s opinion is currently being appealed
by the plaintiffs, see Frommert v. Conkright, Case No. 12-0067-cv (2d Cir. 2012)
(focusing on issues of notice to plan participants of plan changes, as opposed to issues
of plan interpretation already decided by Supreme Court), with the Conkright plaintiffs
being supported by the United States as an amicus. See Brief of the United States
Department of Labor in Support of Petitioners, Frommert v. Conkright, Case No. 120067-cv (2d Cir. 2012). Perhaps, unsurprisingly, the Business Roundtable, the
Chamber of Commerce, and other business groups supported Xerox as amici. See
Brief of Business Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce, & American Benefits Council
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Frommert v. Conkright, Case No. 12-0067cv (2d Cir. 2012).
81
See Meredith Z. Maresca, Lawyers at ABA Meeting Discuss Conkright, Say Case
Doesn’t Change Review Standard, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Feb. 18, 2011)
(“The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last year in Conkright has had little impact on the
standard of review used in evaluating denied benefit claims under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, panelist said . . . .”).
82
The dissent in Conkright argued, however, that “trust law . . . leaves to the
supervising court the decision as to how much weight to give to a plan administrator’s
remedial opinion.” See Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1659-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This
focus on trust law is a classic remedialist Justice move, see supra note 47 and
accompanying text, and one consistent with Breyer’s general communitarian and
egalitarian bents as one of the more progressive Supreme Court Justices.
83
See id. at 1643 (“Respondents claim that deference is less important once a plan
administrator’s interpretation has been found unreasonable, but the interests in
efficiency, predictability, and uniformity do not suddenly disappear simply because of
a single honest mistake, as illustrated by this case.”).
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B. “They Know Not What They Do”
So, on what basis did the Justices in the Conkright majority conclude,
as a factual matter, that Xerox had made a “single honest mistake?” The
retirees had put this evidence in the record, as detailed in their brief to the
Court:
This lawsuit, however, is not about the legality of the phantom
offset. That is so because, in 1989, as part of a major benefits
redesign, Xerox admittedly removed the phantom offset from its
plan.
For the next five years, Xerox sent documents to
respondents indicating that the company would deduct from their
pensions only the actual monies they had previously received. In
1995, however, Xerox did an about-face. It informed respondents
that the company would use the phantom offset to eliminate (or
dramatically reduce) their pensions. Respondents objected, and
after administrative resolution of the dispute proved unsuccessful,
this lawsuit was filed . . . .
Xerox had provided respondents, for five years, with personalized
documents indicating that the offset would be limited to the monies
that respondents had actually received.84
The Justices in the Conkright majority did not mention this evidence in
their opinion. Instead, they appear85 to have taken their cue from Xerox’s
Supreme Court brief:
[D]eference to plan administrators is not restricted to initial claims
determinations. A hair-trigger rule that strips plan administrators
of deference based on a good-faith mistake in the administration of
a plan is not supported by ERISA or this Court’s decisions, and
would thrust federal courts into the role of making difficult and
discretionary decisions under ERISA plans.86

84

See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 2-3, Conkright v. Frommert, 2009 WL
5240210 (2009) (emphasis in original).
85
I advisedly use the word “appears” here. It is simply impossible to know with any
certainty what any of the Justices were thinking based on how they explain themselves
in any case. Or even whether the language that shows up in the final opinion is the
work of one Justice or compromise language fashioned by many Justices. As indicated
above, “this Article [merely] offers an account of how we, as observers of judges’
decisions, make sense of what’s going on in those decisions.” See Cultural Cognition
at Work, supra note 8, at 121 n. 76.
86
Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Conkright v. Frommert, 2009 WL 2954165 (2009)
(emphasis added).
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When there are two conflicting stories of what happened in a case, it is not
unusual for a court to consider that evidence and side with one party or the
other. What is remarkable about the Conkright decision, however, is that
the majority opinion puts the proverbial rabbit in the hat. Without
discussing why one story of the events make more sense than another, the
majority Justices start their opinion by framing the relevant question as:
“[W]hether a single honest mistake in plan interpretation justifies stripping
the administrator of that deference for subsequent related interpretations of
the plan.”87 Of course, it does not, if the mistake was an honest one, and
the Court so holds.88 But, the majority opinion does not even bother to
explain how it came to believe Xerox’s version of the underlying dispute.
There is, in fact, little to no discussion of the facts in the majority
opinion. All we are told by way of explanation is that such a mistake
“should come as no surprise, given that the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 is ‘an enormously complex and detailed statute;’”
“the plans that administrators must construe can be lengthy and
complicated . . . ([t]he one at issue here runs to eighty-one pages, with 139
sections);” and “[f]ortunately, most of the factual details are unnecessary to
the legal issues before us, so we cover them only in broad strokes.”89 Not
only did the retirees present evidence that Xerox had acted intentionally in
misleading them about their benefit rights and then denying them the
requested pension benefits,90 even Xerox itself never used the language of
a “single honest mistake” in its own briefing. Xerox insisted throughout
the case that it did nothing wrong and made no mistakes. It is completely
the Conkright majority’s factual characterization of how Xerox acted
towards these retirees that ended up determining the outcome in Conkright.
C. “If the Facts Don’t Fit the Theory, Change the Facts
It is clear that one could make the argument that the majority Justices
decided they wanted to decide for Xerox and, then, found the reasoning to
get there. Yet, I do not believe, and this is perhaps the most provocative
party of cultural cognition theory, that the majority Justices engaged in
self-conscious, ideological, activist, or outcome-derivative decisionmaking
in Conkright.91 I do not accuse any of the Justices in the Conkright
majority of intellectual dishonesty in this paper. Indeed, if asked, I would
87

Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1644.
See id.
89
Id.
90
See id. at 1643.
91
Accord Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1895, 1964 (2009) (“There may be some judges who care little about their
colleagues’ views and who are determined not to engage in collegial interactions.
However, they are not in the majority.”).
88
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suspect that they would say that the law and the facts could only compel
one, proper result given applicable law under ERISA and the facts of this
case.
I want to contend here that the five Justices who sided with Xerox
simply were not psychologically able to characterize Xerox as dishonest or
acting in bad faith in the interpretation of its own pension plan. Using the
same matrix to define different worldviews held by individuals that Kahan
and his co-authors have used in past cultural cognition studies, it is at least
conceivable to maintain that most of the five-justice majority in Conkright
hold worldviews best described as “hierarchy individualism.”92
These types of individuals “can be viewed as individuals . . . tend to
embrace values such a liberty, market freedom, autonomy, and selfreliance. In the workplace context, these individuals dislike legal
regulations because they undermine their vision of how to run their
businesses.93 Notice that the opinion for the majority consistently focuses
on the complexity of ERISA, the need for efficiency and predictability in
the workplace when it comes to employee benefits, and the problems
associated with interpreting ERISA that would, in any way, increase
employer costs or lead to more litigation.94
Complexity, inefficiency, and unpredictability, all cause much concern
for individuals who “tend to place a high value on social order generally.”95
So, perhaps, what the majority saw depended on the congruence of the
parties’ positions in Conkright with the majority’s own cultural values.96 In
other words, Conkright provides a plausible example of culturallymotivated cognition and a decision which contains many examples of
cognitive illiberalism. Indeed, a similar conclusion might also exist with
regard to the dissenting Justices’ opinion in Conkright but, this time, with
92

The first, hierarchy-egalitarianism measures the subjects’ orientations towards
social orderings that either feature or eschew stratified roles and forms of authority.
The second, individualism-communitarianism, measures their orientations toward
orderings that emphasize individual autonomy and self-sufficiency, on the one hand,
and those that emphasize collective responsibilities and prerogatives, on the other. See,
e.g., They Saw a Protest, supra note 2, at 864-67.
93
Cultural Cognition at Work, supra note 8, at 864-67.
94
See, e.g., Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1644 (“[W]e refused to create such an exception
to Firestone deference in Glenn, recognizing that ERISA law was already complicated
enough without adding ‘special procedural or evidentiary rules’ to the mix.”); id. at
1649 (“Deference promoted efficiency by encouraging resolution of benefits disputes
through internal administrative proceedings rather than costly litigation. It also
promotes predictability, as an employer can rely on the expertise of the plan
administrator rather than worry about unexpected and inaccurate plan interpretations
that might result from de novo judicial review.”).
95
See They Saw a Protest, supra note 2, at 867.
96
See id. at 859 (“’Cultural cognition’ is a species of motivated reasoning that
promotes congruence between a person’s defining group commitments, one the one
hands, and his or her perceptions of risk and related facts, on the other.”).
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the “egalitarian communitarian” label affixed. In short, such motivated
cognition exists equally among both groups of Justices in Conkright.
James Atleson provides theoretical reasoning for why the Justices
might break down along these lines in labor and employment law decisions
in Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law: “Whereas
management efficiency is seen in terms of the lowest per-unit cost of
production, worker perceptions of fairness and justice is quite different.”97
Inevitably, then, the legal decision comes down to a choice among
conflicting cultural norms. The majority in Conkright selected those norms
that place emphasis on the importance of employer authority in the
workplace and on the need to keep the costs of doing business down to a
minimum.98 Under this view, the Justices in the majority unconsciously
applied, in a factually-uncertain environment, a perception that gave
preference to an outcome congenial to their favored way of seeing the
world. As a result, the Xerox retirees and other, like-minded citizens, who
adhere to a now disfavored view of how the courts should interpret pension
plans in this type of case, now question the legitimacy of the Court as a
neutral decisionmaker because they view the Court’s opinion as an exercise
in cognitive illiberalism.99
The most significant consequence of this type of legal decisionmaking
is the generation of needless cultural conflict between groups with different
ideas of workplace fairness with regard to the granting of retirement
benefits. Those who sympathize with the losing retirees in Conkright now
feel discontent with the employee benefits law, while those who identify
with the Court majority feel vindicated that their preexisting biases were
accurate. The Court could have avoided much of this illiberal reasoning by
using psychologically-realistic methods to nip such judicial bias in the bud.
The next section considers specific opinion-writing and institutional
debiasing techniques that could assist in counteracting in future ERISA
cases culturally-motivated cognition and the production of cognitively
illiberal legal opinions.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR ERISA COURTS UTILIZING OPINION-WRITING
DEBIASING STRATEGIES
Although psychologically-based conflicts in factual perception - like
the ones just described in Conkright - threaten democratic pluralism by
97

JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 65
(1983).
98
Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1644.
99
See They Saw a Protest, supra note 2, at 853 (“Just as the integrity of a sporting
contest would be undermined by unconscious favoritism on the part of the referee, so
the legitimacy of the law would likewise be compromised if legal decisionmakers, as a
result of motivated cognition, unwittingly formed perceptions of facts that promoted
the interests and value of groups with whom they had an affinity.”).

20

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 3:1

setting in opposition cultural subgroups, the good news is that there are
techniques that exist to counteract judges’ susceptibility to this form of
culturally-biased decisionmaking. So, cultural cognition theory not only
provides a working theory about how judges may interpret legallyconsequential facts in environments of factual uncertainty and how this
dynamic fosters cognitive illiberalism throughout society, but it also
suggests that such biased decisionmaking is predisposed to various
debiasing strategies. This is because cultural cognition theory maintains
that judges are not fighting over ideology but just over legallyconsequential facts. Therefore, there is reason to believe that judges will
embrace educational and institutional attempts to rid themselves of this
form of bias.100
It is therefore necessary to consider a number of institutional reforms to
counteract these phenomena in the employee benefits law context. I focus
on the idea of creating specialized ERISA courts based on the current
bankruptcy court model.101 The first section of this Part considers whether
a group of professionalized ERISA judges, protected by opacity in their
selection and decisionmaking, would provide an attractive model for
generating culturally-neutral ERISA decisions.102 Because I conclude that
ERISA courts could assist in ridding decisions like Conkright of their
delegitimizing partiality, the second section of this Part briefly expounds
upon how such ERISA judges could utilize opinion-writing debiasing
techniques to reduce instances of cognitive illiberalism in their legal
decisions.103
A. ERISA Courts
To begin with, it should be conceded at the outset that as a practical
matter, there is not much likelihood that Congress will enact legislation in
the near future to create ERISA courts, or even specialized administrative
tribunals, to hear ERISA cases.104 Nevertheless, it is still valuable to
100

See Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe, supra note 6, at 898 (“[J]ust like the
rest of us, [judges] are perfectly capable of understanding that these dynamics exist and
can adversely affect the quality of their decisionmaking.”). Of course, there may be
opportunistic reasons that politicians or even some judges may resist such “educational
and institutional” attempts. I do not deny that; I merely suggest that the audience for
cultural cognition reform might be less hostile than one might first think.
101
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, 395-96; see also id. at 400-06
(exploring various other institutional debiasing strategies including: magistrate judge
models, specialized Article III appellate courts (like the Federal Circuit), and British
employment tribunals).
102
See infra at pp. 20-24.
103
See infra at pp. 24-27.
104
The current political environment, where politicians seek to outdo one another in
their calls to cut the size of the federal government and the amount of federal spending,
would strongly suggest that any call for further specialization of the federal judiciary
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consider, as a thought experiment (or as a “pragmatic conjecture”), the
potential benefits of having, one day, a professionalized group of judges to
hear ERISA cases. I, therefore, again take out my “analytical toolbox,”105
considering the possibility of developing an Article I ERISA court in the
style of the federal bankruptcy courts.106
The whole idea behind the creation of ERISA courts would be to create
a “method for debiasing judges . . . through making them more familiar
with legal doctrine in [a given] area of law.”107 Familiarity with such a
complex area of law would, in turn, make it less likely that judges would
need to decide cases by falling back on culturally-motivated ideas of how
best to interpret ambiguous facts commonly found in such cases.108 At the
end of the day, then, with the addition of some of the opinion-writing
debiasing strategies discussed in the next section, the hope would be that
fewer cognitively illiberal decisions like Conkright would be produced.109
In many ways, ERISA cases would be ideally suited for bankruptcy
court-style adjudication. First, ERISA courts would not interfere with any
existing employee benefit law adjudicatory framework because there does
not exist any federal or state administrative agency with primary or initial
authority to consider such cases.110 Second, the expansive nature of ERISA
would likely fall on deaf ears. See BAUM, supra note 5, at 205 (commenting that one
“reason for the dearth of specialized courts is the difficulty of securing major changes
in judicial structure that require legislation.”). It should also be pointed out that
Congress considered, during the enactment, the idea of creating an alternative dispute
resolution system to adjudicate ERISA claims, and Congress rejected these ideas at
least three separate times during that Congress.
105
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 414 (advancing “spectrum of
debiasing strategies to provide an analytical toolbox for legislators and other
policymakers to consider in bolstering the legitimacy of the law.”).
106
Whereas the federal Constitution establishes the U.S. Supreme Court and gives
the power to Congress to establish lower federal courts in Article III of the
Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, bankruptcy courts were established under
Congress’ Article I Inferior Tribunal Clause Power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978. See generally Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed:
Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978: Part One, Outside
Looking In, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1985) (“[T]he Court has long recognized that
Congress is not barred from acting pursuant to its powers under Article I to vest
decisionmaking authority in tribunals that lack the attributes of Article III courts.”).
107
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 392 (“Judges who specialize in a
narrow range of policy become immersed in the subject matter of the case on which
they focus.”); see BAUM, supra note 5, at 35.
108
See BAUM, supra note 5, at 35 (“When commentators speak of judicial expertise
as something more than a source of efficiency, what they really mean is that expert
judges will produce higher-quality decisions than nonexperts.”).
109
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 394 (contending that with
introduction of specialized labor courts, “cognitive illiberalism will be diminished
when more evenhandedly decided cases are processed by ‘losers’ in the politico-legal
wars.”).
110
One of the potential concerns with establishing more broadly-based “labor and
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preemption would mean that there would not be federalism concerns over
interfering with state sovereign authority to regulate in this area.111 Third,
federal district trial courts would be relieved of cases which are
increasingly taking over space on their crowded dockets and also taking a
relatively long time to resolve.112 Fourth, specialized judges, with
enhanced knowledge of their subject area, would be more likely to produce
consistent adjudicative outcomes which, in turn, would assist parties in
planning their future conduct and predicting the legality of their conduct in
the employee benefits law context.113
Other advantages supporting a bankruptcy court model for ERISA
cases include the selective manner in which the federal court of appeals
would pick such judges114 and the relative autonomy such judges would
have from political pressures.115 As far as the autonomy advantage, the

employment law” courts would be that such courts might inadvertently interfere with
existing federal administrative schemes, and the primary jurisdiction of such agencies
as the National Labor Relations Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. See id. at 396 n. 129. Because ERISA cases may generally be brought
directly to federal court, and internal administrative exhaustion is only a temporary
obstacle in Section 502(a)(1)(B) benefit denial cases there would be no similar concern.
See Cultural Cognition at Work, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
111
See Sorry, No Remedy, supra note 46, at 13 (describing how “[c]ourts broadly
interpret the preemption provisions of ERISA, [under Section 514,] to invalidate
employee benefits-related state laws.”).
112
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 393 (“[R]eflecting the growing
complexity of labor law cases, the number of actions pending for three years or more
increased by 69.25 percent during the . . . period [from 2000 to 2009].”). ERISA cases
make up more than half of labor law cases pending for more than three years during
this same period. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2009, Table S-11, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscour
ts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S11Sep09.pdf.
113
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 406-08; see generally Sarang Vijay
Damle, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from the German Constitutional
Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267 (2005) (noting how the German Federal Constitutional
Court and its “rapporteur” system might provide an appropriate balance between the
benefits of generalist judges and the need for judicial expertise as law).
114
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 397-98 (describing the selective
manner in which bankruptcy court judges are selected and specifically setting forth the
procedure in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
115
See id. at 398 (pointing out that although bankruptcy judges do not have the life
tenure and secure compensation of Article III judges, “[t]he selection process of
bankruptcy judges by the courts of appeals encourages merit-based selection of
bankruptcy judges based on their professional credentials rather than their political
leanings.”). Of course, the lack of Senate confirmation proceedings for such judges
would make their appointment easier and less politically sensitive. See id. at 399
(“This is a significant advantage given the highly partisan nature of labor and
employment disputes between union and management or between employer and
employee.”).
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selection of ERISA court judges by Article III judges, hidden to a
substantial degree from public notice and comment, might provide the
protection of opacity for such selection processes.116 Finally, if the ERISA
bar had the same input into the selection of ERISA court judges as the
current bankruptcy bar does with regard to bankruptcy trial courts, that
dynamic could lead to both judge and attorney groups working together to
promote a professional judiciary that places a high value on pragmatic
solutions to the problems specific to the employee benefits law
community.117
Of course, there would also be plenty of objections to the creation of
ERISA courts. First and foremost, one could reasonably object that there is
nothing that is much more difficult to understand about ERISA than other
areas of law, or more susceptible to culturally-motivated cognition, such
that there is a special need for Article I courts.118 Yet, a number of
commentators have noted the particular complexity of labor and
employment law generally.119 If anything, and as the Supreme Court
readily admits in many cases like Conkright, ERISA is even more
complex.120 Perhaps, it is sufficient to say at this juncture that ERISA
appears sufficiently complex to most knowledgeable observers to merit
specialized court consideration.121
116

See generally Rafael I. Pardo, The Utility of Opacity in Judicial Selection, 64
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 633 (2009). “The term ‘opacity’ is used by Pardo to
describe candidate selection processes that are closed in nature, or opaque, in contrast
to transparent selection processes that are open to the public.” Cognitive Illiberalism,
supra note 12, at 412 n. 13.
117
See Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy
Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 798 (2010) (stating that the bankruptcy bar recognizes
bankruptcy judges “for creative and energetic management of cases,” “corralling
difficult cases and bringing them to a conclusion efficiently”).
118
In some real sense, the answer to this important question is unknowable to
someone like me who is not an expert in these other areas of law and will likely never
plunge headlong into their fathomless depths. I can only say with any certainty that
ERISA is a comparatively complex area of the law based on its judicial reputation and
based on the time it takes to adjudicate an average case. See supra notes 43 and 110
and accompanying text.
119
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 393-94 n. 115; see also BAUM, supra
note 5, at 219 (“Advocates of specialized courts argue that concentration of judges
enhances expertise and thus the quality of decisions. The argument is made with the
greatest force in fields in which the law or case facts are unusually complex, such as
patents and taxes.”).
120
See, e.g., supra notes15, 48, and 99 and accompanying text; see also Maher &
Stris, supra note 20, at 453-54 (explaining that the increasing complexity of benefit
promises under ERISA “militates in favor of increased protection” because it
“increases expectation uncertainty on the part of employees . . .”). But see Stumpff,
supra note 3 (suggesting ERISA’s complexity may render it inaccessible).
121
See Langbein, supra note 5, at 229 (“ERISA is an ideal field for experimenting
with specialized courts: It is complex, it is important, and it is relatively well delimited
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Nevertheless, there are a number of admittedly additional
disadvantages that come with specialized courts. Such disadvantages
include: “1) judicial ‘tunnel vision,’ 2) the risk of judicial capture by
special interests, and 3) excessive judicial bias rooted in familiarity with
the subject matter.”122 Additionally, there might be concern that even if
ERISA courts have judges more versed in employee benefits law and less
likely to reflexively fall back on cultural background norms, such cases
will nevertheless make their way through the lower federal courts and,
perhaps, all the way to the Supreme Court with the same culturally-biased
decisionmaking still possible.
In response to this first set of three traditional concerns about
specialized courts, one can just note in passing that these concerns exist for
all specialized courts, and ERISA courts would not necessarily entail
greater problems in this regard.123 On the second point concerning the
continuing unmitigated nature of cognitively-biased appellate review,
perhaps ERISA judges would do a better job of laying out the contested
factual issues in such cases, understanding the importance of such record
evidence to the outcome of these cases. In turn, appellate courts, by dint of
established standards of appellate review, would have no choice but to
consider the ERISA court’s factual record under deferential standards.124
In all, although there are indeed concerns with the creation of yet
another specialized court to hear another class of complex legal cases, on
balance, and for the reasons discussed above, a future Congress should
explore creating ERISA courts. These courts hold the promise of providing
“increased uniformity, enhanced decisional quality, greater systemic
efficiency, and decisions free from culturally-motivated cognition and the
associated societal problems of cognitive illiberalism.”125
B. ERISA Courts and the Utilization of Opinion-Writing
Debiasing Strategies
ERISA courts can start the project of counteracting cognitive
illiberalism in their judicial opinions by “divest[ing] the law of culturally
partisan overtones that detract from the law’s legitimacy” through opinionfrom other fields.”).
122
See Damle, supra note 113, at 1269; see also Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note
12, at 408-09 (elaborating on each of these disadvantages of specialization).
123
See generally BAUM, supra note 5.
124
See Ronald J. Krotowszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism
and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of
Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1599, 1619 n. 93 (2012) (“In ‘core proceedings,’ a district court can review the
bankruptcy court’s findings of fact only ‘under traditional appellate standards,’ [i.e.,
clearly erroneous standard,] rather than de novo.”).
125
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 410.

2013]

CULTURAL COGNITION INSIGHTS

25

writing debiasing strategies.126 Such approaches might keep cases like
Conkright from reoccurring. These strategies, which will be considered
seriatim, are: (1) judicial humility and aporetic engagement; (2) expressive
over-determination and self-affirmation; and (3) trimming.127
First, one of the primary impacts of cognitive illiberalism is that it
leads judges to believe in the unassailable correctness of their version of
facts and events. You often hear such judges use phrases like “no
reasonable person could disagree,” or “there is only one possible
conclusion to draw.” Such conclusive language, while vindicating those
who agree with the case outcome, unnecessarily alienates those who
disagree. Developing habits of judicial humility means developing a state
of mind that recognizes that even judges can misjudge facts in a case,128
especially in cases like Conkright, which elicit a substantial volume of
community outrage.129 For instance, rather than just assuming, without
discussion, that Xerox had made a “single honest mistake” in plan
interpretation without much discussion of the facts leading to that
conclusion, the Conkright majority should have set out the various factual
stories advanced by the parties, examined them, and then used aporetic
language to acknowledge the complexities of the case before it.130 So,
whereas “[h]umility connotes consciousness of one’s own limits in solving
a problem; aporia emphasizes the limited amenability of the problem to a
satisfactory solution, along with the apprehension of the same.”131 These
qualities will permit judges in future ERISA cases to draft opinions without
the appearance of ideologically-driven reasoning and without the need to
denigrate the views of the losing side.132 Although such an approach may
not lead to a different case outcome in a case like Conkright, the resulting
opinion will be less likely to fan the flames of partisanship.
The second technique is expressive over-determination, and it involves
the related idea of self-affirmation. This approach is very much related to
habits of judicial humility and aporetic engagement. It encourages “judges
126

See id. at 375.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2009)
[hereinafter Trimming] (describing “trimming” as an approach that “squarely rejects
not only rights fundamentalism and democratic primacy but also minimalism . . . on the
ground that the Court should settle a large area of the law and should not leave the
fundamental questions undecided.”).
128
See Cultural Cognition at Work, supra note 8, at 140-41.
129
See id. at 143.
130
“Judicial idioms of aporia,” refers t a type of argument which acknowledges the
complexity of a subject under discussion. See They Saw a Protest, supra note 2, at
898.
131
See Foreword: Neutral Principles, supra note 37, at 67 n. 347.
132
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 389-90 (“[T]he practices of humility
and writing opinions in an aporetic manner encourages judges to self-reflect on how
culturally motivated cognition may color their view of legally consequential facts and,
thereafter, avoid basing decisions on those biases.”).
127
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to interpret laws in a manner that seeks to accommodate competing
worldviews.”133 Having left behind one’s unequivocal pronouncements
under the former approach, legal opinions can now be written in a way that
allows different cultural worldviews to find constructive meaning in the
court’s language and, thereby, to self-affirm their own identity. The trick
here is to use language in a way that allows different groups to conjure up a
“plurality of meanings” from the court’s decisional language. Again,
although this approach may not change the outcome of the case, it will
allow opposing groups to accept the legitimacy of the court’s reasoning
more readily. Consider, in this regard, if the Court in Conkright had
utilized language which permitted Xerox a second chance to reinterpret its
pension plan but had also more forthrightly chastised the company for its
past practices as far as communicating with plan participants. This tactic
would have made clear that the Court would not tolerate such sharp
practices from Xerox or from other employers in similar circumstances in
the future.
Finally, “trimming,” the last examined, opinion-writing debiasing
strategy, is a technique that might actually lead to a different case outcome
in cases like Conkright. It involves a judicial decisionmaking method of
“reject[ing[ the extremes and . . . borrow[ing] ideas from both sides of
intense social controversies.”134 As already indicated, without Xerox even
briefing the point, the Conkright majority concluded that Xerox’s conduct
in the case clearly amounted to a single honest mistake of plan
interpretation. The plaintiffs believed, of course, that this was a concerted
effort on Xerox’s part to deprive them of their earned pension monies. So
what would an ERISA court judge engaged in trimming do?
Well, according to Professor Sunstein, a judicial trimmer would “tend
to eng up between the extremes, in a way that makes both [sides] believe
that they have gained, or not lost, something of importance.”135 This
approach ensures judges identify “what is deepest and most appealing in
competing positions” so as to safeguard against, “to the extent possible,
[that] no one is, or feels, rejected or repudiated.”136 In Conkright,
“captur[ing] the most plausible convictions of the adversaries” might have
meant coming to a decision that recognized the importance of judicial
deference to plan administrators in most Firestone and Glenn-type cases
under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) but recognizing that the facts in
Conkright did not suggest this was an everyday case of that variety.
In fact, given the long duration of the litigation (close to ten years) and
133

See id. at 390 (describing expressive overdetermination as a technique that seeks
to allow “each community” to “find meanings in a decision that affirms some of its
worldviews.”).
134
See Trimming, supra note 127, at 1053-54.
135
Id. at 1054.
136
Id. at 1058-59.
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the amount of success plaintiffs had enjoyed in the lower federal courts,137
the Conkright court could have fashioned a trimmed decision in favor of
plaintiffs that would have “show[n] respect for all views while avoiding [a]
decision[] based on their own culturally biased motivations.”138 For
instance, a specific example of a trimmed decision in Conkright could have
stated:
Plaintiffs prevailed in this case because the rule henceforth will be
that in the aftermath of an unreasonable act by the plan
administrator, a judge can choose, or choose not, to defer. Here,
the Second Circuit chose not to defer, and that decision makes
sense given the facts of this case. In other circumstances, a judge
might have been wise to defer again, such as in cases in which the
administrator made a single and timely-corrected mistake.
In all, then, specialized ERISA courts utilizing these opinion-writing
debiasing techniques would be more likely to generate legal opinions
that “communicate [their] commitment to using [judicial interpretation]
methods impartially.”139 They would also avoid being “unwittingly
impelled to form perceptions of fact, interpretation of doctrine, and
evaluations of legal arguments congenial to their own worldviews.”140
In short, these ERISA courts would have the analytical tools to
circumvent cognitively illiberal outcomes like the one in Conkright v.
Frommert.
V. CONCLUSION
The goal of this article has been to put into practice institutional
and opinion-writing debiasing strategies in the ERISA context to
counteract culturally-motivated cognition and the problems associated
with cognitive illiberalism. My contention is that not only does the
development of a professionalized group of ERISA judges hold out the
promise of minimizing needless discontent with employee benefits
law, but ERISA courts will more likely generate efficiency, uniformity,
and predictability in their legal decisions, based on their familiarity
with this complex area of law.
Because ERISA court judges would also end up being better
137

See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 1, Conkright v. Frommert, 2009 WL
226500 (2009) (“Since this case was filed nearly ten years ago, three decisions of the
Second Circuit have conclusively established that Xerox cannot properly use a
‘phantom account.’”).
138
See Cognitive Illiberalism, supra note 12, at 392 (citing Trimmings, supra note
127 at 1070).
139
See Foreword: Neutral Principles, supra note 37, at 59.
140
Id. at 27-28.
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informed, legal decisionmakers, they will also be less likely to have to
fill gaps in their legal knowledge by engaging in culturally-motivated
cognition. To the extent that cultural cognition still ends up inevitably
playing some role in their decisionmaking processes, these judges will
be readily able to use opinion-writing debiasing strategies to assist
them in living up to their neutrality commitment to decide cases in a
manner free from the taint of cognitive illiberalism.

